When the clubhouse doors swung open, reporters swarmed Neil Walker at his locker in the home clubhouse at PNC Park. It was Oct. 7, 2015, and the Pirates had just ended a 98-win season — a win total they hadn’t exceeded since 1909 — with a shutout loss to the Cubs’ Jake Arrieta in the National League wild-card game. Players sat in stunned silence in the clubhouse. Walker was asked whether he’d considered that this may have been his last game with the Pirates.

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“I’d be lying if I told you no,” Walker answered quietly. “There’s no telling.”

Walker wouldn’t play another game for the Pirates, and neither would a handful of other veterans around the room: A.J. Burnett, J.A. Happ, Pedro Alvarez, Charlie Morton, Joakim Soria, Joe Blanton and Aramis Ramirez.

The writing was on the wall. The Pirates had a sizable core growing more expensive by the year, and the front office would choose to supplement it with discount free agents and an incoming wave of prospects. This was the Pirates’ plan for perpetual contention. And that approach — trying to build a perennial playoff team while operating with a small payroll — went up in flames.

To this day, the 2015-16 offseason is a flash point for Pirates fans. The Pirates plummeted from 98 wins to 78 wins in one year. Momentum evaporated. There were countless reasons. The patchwork rotation — including Ryan Vogelsong, Jon Niese and Juan Nicasio at times — was weak. The prospects weren’t ready for prime time. And then there’s this dirty word: regression. It’s worth saying.

In 2015, the Pirates had five 3-WAR players. In 2016, with all five still on the roster, they had only one 3-WAR player (Starling Marte). Consider this list of every Pirates player who had an above-replacement-level season in 2015 and played again for the Pirates in 2016. Almost every one of them was worse.

Pirates returners by WAR, 2015 to 2016

This isn’t to absolve the Pirates front office for its offseason activity in 2015-16, but it does help explain how a team gets 20 wins worse that quickly — its top 15 returners produced 18 fewer WAR year over year. But that’s only one issue.

What went wrong? is a simple question with no easy answer. A summary of the five-year spiral involves poor prospect development, bad trades, slashed payroll, cratering attendance, chaos in the clubhouse and, eventually, the dismissal of team president Frank Coonelly, general manager Neal Huntington, manager Clint Hurdle and others. The front office surely deserves blame, but how much? If Huntington could rewrite history, what would be done differently?

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Let’s rewind to the 2015-16 offseason, before the Pirates fell apart, and analyze 17 major moves since then and their long-term impact. Hindsight being what it is, it’s tempting to cherry-pick transactions and unspool cause and effect, but the truth is that a number of moves graded as inconsequential or mixed. Plenty were positive. But, in the end, the mistakes outweighed the rest.

Dec. 2, 2015: Pirates non-tender Alvarez

The price wasn’t worth the power. Unable to find a trade partner, Huntington cut ties with Alvarez — whose 111 home runs from 2012 to 2015 were second to Giancarlo Stanton’s 125 among NL hitters — rather than pay the projected $8 million Alvarez would have earned in arbitration.

In hindsight: Good move. You may recall Alvarez, a defensive liability, wasn’t even in the starting lineup in the 2015 wild-card game. Homers are sexy, but Huntington saved money and found equal value by platooning John Jaso, David Freese and Sean Rodriguez at first base the following season. Josh Bell was on track to take over at first base by 2017. Alvarez hit 22 home runs as Baltimore’s part-time DH in 2016 but would not have saved the Pirates.

Dec. 9, 2015: Walker traded to Mets for Niese

The Pirates and the Pittsburgh kid, entering his last year of arbitration, were not close to a contract extension. So, Huntington pulled the trigger on a trade that sent Walker to the Mets for Niese. Huntington called it “a good baseball trade.” The salaries were similar, but Niese had two club options left.

In hindsight: Mistake. This was neither a popular move nor a smart one. Walker had averaged 2.7 WAR per season with the Pirates, and he had 2.2 WAR, an .823 OPS and 23 homers for the Mets in 2016. Meanwhile, Niese, for the same price, posted a 4.91 ERA for the Pirates and couldn’t hold down a rotation spot. Niese was later kicked back to the Mets for reliever Antonio Bastardo at the trade deadline. It was Niese’s last year in the majors.

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Dec. 12, 2015: Morton dealt to Phillies for David Whitehead

This was a salary dump. Morton, a sinker-baller with a 4.81 ERA in 2015, was due $8 million in the final year of a three-year, $21 million contract.

In hindsight: Mixed. Morton was somewhat expensive and mostly ineffective, so the trade made sense at the time. He also missed almost the entire 2016 season with a hamstring injury. Still, the Pirates’ mistake was not realizing what they had in Morton. They were unable to unlock the hard-throwing, top-of-the-rotation starter who has come to life in Houston and Tampa. And without Burnett, Happ and Morton, the Pirates pinned their rotation hopes on Vogelsong, Nicasio and prospects in 2016. (It went poorly.)

March 11, 2016: Free agent David Freese signs one-year deal

The Pirates signing Freese — one year, $3 million — during spring training was a surprise. But it made sense. Jung Ho Kang was expected to miss at least the first month of the season as he rehabbed from a serious knee injury.

In hindsight: Good move. Freese was in the back half of a career in which he had won a World Series ring and been NLCS and World Series MVP. He came cheap and brought a veteran presence to the clubhouse. He spoke his mind, filled in capably at third base and also platooned at first base once it was clear Jason Rogers and Michael Morse were non-factors. In August 2016, Freese signed a two-year, $11 million extension to stay in Pittsburgh.

April/May 2016: Gregory Polanco and Francisco Cervelli agree to contract extensions

Having already extended McCutchen and Marte, the Pirates gave Polanco a five-year, $35 million extension with two club options. A month later, they locked up their starting catcher with a three-year, $31 million extension.

In hindsight: Mistake. Injuries scotched the initial promise of these deals. The Polanco contract, in particular, looked like a steal at the time. He was only 24 and had shown flashes of his elite potential. But neither Polanco nor Cervelli has matched their 2015 games-played total in any season since then. Instead, the Pirates had invested a significant percentage of their payroll in two players — one hounded by concussions, and the other with hamstring, knee and shoulder issues. Polanco still has time to prove his worth. Cervelli is a Marlin.

July 30, 2016: Mark Melancon traded to Nationals for Felipe Vazquez and Taylor Hearn

One closer begat the next. With the Pirates three games out of a wild-card spot, Huntington traded two months of Melancon — a three-time All-Star with a 1.80 ERA in four years in Pittsburgh — for Vazquez and Hearn.

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In hindsight: Good move. Not only did the Melancon trade save the Pirates more than $3 million — and they would save even more in another trade two days later — but it got them a future closer in Vazquez who’d soon be posting Melancon-esque numbers at a fraction of the salary. Hearn was a high-ceiling prospect who the Pirates later flipped, along with Sherten Apostel, to the Rangers for Keone Kela, the Pirates’ current closer.

Aug. 1, 2016: Pirates trade Francisco Liriano and prospects Reese McGuire and Harold Ramirez to Blue Jays for Drew Hutchison …

While Huntington said there was “absolutely not” a directive from ownership to shed payroll, it was hard then — and even harder now — to believe that. After years of criticism for his aversion to trading prospects, Huntington was punting two of them to Toronto in order to move Liriano’s contract.

… and acquire Ivan Nova from Yankees for Tito Polo and Stephen Tarpley

Over the course of trade-deadline week, the Pirates had given up Melancon, Liriano, Niese, McGuire, Ramirez, Polo and Tarpley to add Nova, Vazquez, Bastardo, Hearn and Hutchison and clear roughly $13 million in salary.

In hindsight: Mistake. On one hand, losing Liriano’s salary, according to Huntington, later allowed the Pirates to re-sign Nova in free agency. On the other hand: Hutchison threw only 11 innings for the Pirates, and to this day they could use McGuire’s help at catcher. Huntington’s explanation for the trades at the time was that he wanted to still give the Pirates a playoff-caliber team in 2016, while bettering their odds in 2017 and 2018. The Melancon trade accomplished that. The Nova trade was all right. The Liriano trade, however, was a warning sign that the Pirates couldn’t afford a single misfire in free agency, like Liriano, and that the cost to correct it was paid in prospects.

December 2016: Signing free agents Daniel Hudson and Nova

After turning in a 3.06 ERA in two months with the Pirates, Nova re-signed on a three-year, $26 million contract in free agency. Hudson agreed to a two-year, $11 million deal. In most camps, these aren’t massive contracts. But considering how the Pirates spend in free agency, this was a big month.

In hindsight: Meh. Hudson was mediocre in his only season with the Pirates, but his lows were awfully low. He had a 4.38 ERA in 2017 and was then involved in the trade that brought the Pirates Corey Dickerson from the Rays the following spring. Nova was mediocre on the whole, too, with 4.16 ERA and 99 ERA+ in 2017 and 2018. That he started 30 games per season was a blessing. The Pirates traded Nova prior to the 2019 season for minor leaguer Yordi Rosario and $500,000 in international bonus pool space.

July 31, 2017: Tony Watson traded to Dodgers for Oneil Cruz and Angel German

The Pirates were 5 1/2 games out of playoff position at the 2017 trade deadline, and Huntington again added a little and subtracted a little, shipping out the trusty Watson and bringing in veteran reliever Joaquin Benoit.

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In hindsight: Good move. The Benoit acquisition was a head-scratcher for a team slipping from contention, but the return on the Watson trade made it a successful trade deadline. Huntington held onto his core and added an enticing prospect in Cruz. Today, Cruz is a fascinating 6-foot-7 shortstop prospect ranked by Fangraphs as the No. 32 prospect in baseball. Like with Melancon, Huntington had again traded a rental reliever for high-upside prospects.

Aug. 31, 2017: Phillies claim Juan Nicasio on outright waivers

Nicasio had a 2.85 ERA when he was placed on trade waivers — standard practice in August. An NL contender claimed Nicasio, and Huntington rescinded the trade waivers. He then put Nicasio on irrevocable outright waivers hoping a playoff-caliber AL team would claim him.

In hindsight: Meh. Though this had little long-lasting impact, it briefly was a public-relations mess. The Phillies took Nicasio before any AL team could. Huntington got nothing except $600,000 in savings. He said the “unusual move” had nothing to do with money. But it chafed the fanbase anyway. Nicasio remained in the NL, and, making matters worse for Huntington, the Phillies traded Nicasio a week later to the Cardinals for a minor leaguer.

Sept. 4, 2017: Hurdle and Huntington sign extensions

Though the Pirates were set to miss the playoffs for the second consecutive season, Pirates owner Bob Nutting handed Hurdle and Huntington four-year extensions to keep them in Pittsburgh through 2021.

In hindsight: Mistake. A very costly mistake, and Nutting would pay handsomely for his decision to extend the manager and general manager. Hurdle and Huntington were both fired after the 2019 season, leaving the Pirates to buy out the remainder of their contracts — as well as a couple of others in the front office — while trying to turn the page after a 93-loss season.

Jan. 13, 2018: Gerrit Cole traded to Astros for Joe Musgrove, Colin Moran, Michael Feliz and Jason Martin

Cole was backsliding — his ERA rising from 2.60 (2015) to 3.88 (2016) to 4.26 (2017) — and the clock was ticking. With Cole two years from free agency, Huntington dealt him to Houston for four players at or near the major league level. The Astros added a potential ace to their already loaded rotation.

In hindsight: Mistake. The Pirates’ haul was a quantity-over-quality bet from the beginning. The Astros kept their most coveted prospects. Now, knowing what we know about Cole, this is an unforgivable underpay. He thrived in Houston, posting a 2.68 ERA and 164 ERA+ over two seasons while striking out 13.1 batters per nine innings. Meanwhile, Musgrove has yet to crack 98 ERA+, Moran is an average hitter and poor defender, Feliz is trying to hold a roster spot, and Martin has 20 games in the majors.

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Six months after the Cole trade, the Pirates went searching for — imagine this — a top-end starting pitcher on the trade market. They found Chris Archer.

Jan. 15, 2018: McCutchen and cash sent to Giants for Bryan Reynolds and Kyle Crick

It felt inevitable that the face of the franchise would be gone sooner than later. The Pirates picked up his 2018 option and then struck a deal with the Giants.

In hindsight: Good move. McCutchen’s numbers had taken a sharp downturn since his peak — the former NL MVP had a .905 OPS and 152 OPS+ from 2011 to 2015 — and the Giants have to be kicking themselves for this trade. Reynolds batted .314 with an .880 OPS as a rookie last season. “The safe play would have been to keep (McCutchen),” Huntington said at the time. “The safe play would have been to keep Gerrit Cole. … We didn’t feel that was the right play.” So, Huntington made two safe plays that week. One of them was right.

Jan. 18, 2018: Vazquez signs club-friendly extension

Just as the Pirates were finalizing the McCutchen trade, reports surfaced that they’d signed their shutdown closer to an outrageously cheap contract extension — a contract so club-friendly that it threatened to upset the closer market around the league. Vazquez had given his sister, Prescilla, negotiating power, and had signed a four-year deal worth $22 million, with two club options.

In hindsight: Good move. Closers with 1.67 ERAs don’t often approach their front office asking to get an affordable deal done. But here was Vazquez agreeing to an extension that gave him no more than $7.25 million guaranteed in every season, and a $7 million average annual value even if both options were exercised. It seemed that the Pirates surely could trade him at any point for a package of prospects, but there was no rush. Vazquez was an All-Star in 2018 and 2019. Of course, the outlook of this extension looks far different today. Vazquez is in Westmoreland County jail, awaiting trial on child sex charges.

Feb. 22, 2018: Dickerson acquired for Hudson and Tristan Gray

The Rays had DFA’d Dickerson to shed his $5.95 million salary, even though he had been an All-Star with an .815 OPS and 27 home runs in 2017. He had two seasons left before free agency. The Pirates had a new left fielder.

In hindsight: Good move. Getting a discount on Dickerson was unexpected and made perfect sense for the Pirates. Hudson had underdelivered in Pittsburgh. The Rays would release him a month later. The knock on Dickerson was his defense. In his first year with the Pirates, he won a Gold Glove. He batted .303 with an .826 OPS over parts of two seasons with the Pirates. You could argue that Dickerson’s hot bat played a part in Huntington’s 2018 trade-deadline dealing. The Pirates went on a 13-1 tear in July 2018, and Dickerson had a 1.251 OPS in that stretch. Had Dickerson and the Pirates not kept winning and winning, Huntington may never have considered …

July 31, 2018: Trading Tyler Glasnow, Austin Meadows and Shane Baz for Archer

Just months after trading McCutchen and Cole, Huntington saw his team surge to four games above .500 and three games from a wild-card spot. He went all in, parting with Glasnow, Meadows and Baz. The allure of Archer’s potential and his contract, with club options through 2021, was enough.

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In hindsight: Mistake. In the press conference that day, Huntington acknowledged he was making a “much bigger bet on Chris Archer” than he typically made. He believed Archer would bounce back. But so far, he has not. Archer has a 4.92 ERA with the Pirates. Meanwhile, Meadows was an All-Star with a .922 OPS last season. Glasnow is a revelation, posting a 1.78 ERA in 12 electrifying starts last season. Baz is a touted prospect who touches triple digits.

Huntington’s tenure didn’t end with the Archer trade, but anything afterward proved inconsequential. There were minor acquisitions — Lonnie Chisenhall, Melky Cabrera, Jordan Lyles, Erik Gonzalez and prospect Tahnaj Thomas, to name a few — but nothing could change the fact that the Archer trade had backfired on Huntington in every way imaginable. His bet had sunk him.

Pirates fans had pleaded for Huntington to reel in an Archer, a top-of-the-rotation starter, at previous trade deadlines. And the general manager had held steady, tip-toeing through this strange dance of adding here and subtracting there and staying the course every July. This time, either swayed by the winning streak or uninspired by Glasnow and Meadows, Huntington broke character.

It would cost him his job.

The premise of perennial contention was doomed. Operating with a small payroll, little depth and a razor-thin margin for error, Huntington’s plan was handcuffed by player regression in 2016, followed in ensuing seasons by a lengthy suspension (Marte), Tommy John surgeries (Jameson Taillon, Chad Kuhl and Edgar Santana) and serious legal trouble (Kang and Vazquez).

Now, let’s address the elephant in this analysis: Spending. It’s easy to see how several of the mistakes listed above might have been solved by an increased payroll. Huntington was required to work within the budget provided him by Nutting. If financial flexibility weren’t a top priority, maybe Huntington would rethink the salary dumps and the insistence on recouping value for expiring contracts. Maybe he would sign a proven starting pitcher in free agency rather than chase one at the trade deadline. Or maybe he wouldn’t change a thing.

(Huntington didn’t respond to an interview request for this story.)

One night five years ago, two weeks before the wild-card game, the Pirates clinched their third consecutive playoff berth and toasted with champagne flutes at Coors Field. They were on top of the baseball world, even if they were second in their division. The Pirates were getting used to this feeling, this postseason high. Walker was the hero that night, with four hits and six RBIs.

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“It’s no surprise to me where we’re at,” Walker said at his locker, clueless his Pirates career was all but over. “But, trust me, we won’t forget where we were.”

Check out the complete Do Over series on this topic page

(Top photo of Gregory Polanco and Aramis Ramirez: Doug Pensinger / Getty Images)

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